Showing posts with label upward mobility. Show all posts
Showing posts with label upward mobility. Show all posts

Thursday, May 3, 2018

Class, Culture, and Moving Upward


I mentioned the other day that I’ve been reading J. D. Vance’s memoir, Hillbilly Elegy. It’s been on my reading list since late 2016, when it made a stir by explaining why so many people who used to vote reliably Democrat voted for Donald Trump.

I heard about the book when the author gave an Uncommon Knowledge interview. What interested me wasn’t so much the explanation for Trump voters, although that’s interesting. But it explains the value of social capital, and most particularly the value of strong families.

J. D. Vance (right), screen shot from Uncommon Knowledge


I appreciate Vance’s ability to identify the social and psychological issues, with a clear, insider’s view of what policies haven’t worked and why. By the end of his Marine Corps service, he was politically conservative. And life—if you can understand it from the inside—probably leads naturally to that viewpoint.

What surprised me much more than I expected about the book is how much his story resonates with me personally. So I’m working through that too.

But I’d like to share a few of Vance’s insights, because I think it’s another support of the Spherical Model, with the political, economic, and social spheres all interrelated.

In his late teen years, J. D. worked at a local grocery store. He handled plenty of people on welfare, and gained some insights:

I also learned how people gamed the welfare system. They’d buy two dozen-packs of soda with food stamps and then sell them at a discount for cash. They’d ring up their orders separately, buying food with food stamps, and beer, wine, and cigarettes with cash. They’d regularly go through the checkout line speaking on their cell phones. I could never understand why our lives felt like a struggle while those living off of government largesse enjoyed trinkets that I only dreamed about.
Mamaw [his grandmother] listened intently to my experiences at Dillman’s. We began to view much of our fellow working class with mistrust. Most of us were struggling to get by, but we made do, worked hard, and hoped for a better life. But a large minority was content to live off the dole. Every two weeks, I’d get a small paycheck and notice the line where federal and state income taxes were deducted from my wages. At least as often, our drug-addict neighbor would buy T-bone steaks, which I was too poor to buy for myself but was forced by Uncle Sam to buy for someone else. This was my mind-set when I was seventeen, and though I’m far less angry today than I was then, it was my first indication that the policies of Mamaw’s “party of the working man”—the Democrats—weren’t all they were cracked up to be (pp. 418-420)[i].
He adds in some outside commentary at this point:

Political scientists have spent millions of words trying to explain how Appalachia and the South went from staunchly Democratic to staunchly Republican in less than a generation. Some blame race relations and the Democratic Party’s embrace of the civil rights movement. Others cite religious faith and the hold that social conservatism has on evangelicals in that region. A big part of the explanation lies in the fact that many in the white working class saw precisely what I did, working at Dillman’s. As far back as the 1970s, the white working class began to turn to Richard Nixon because of a perception that, as one man put it, government was “payin’ people who are on welfare today doin’ nothin’! They’re laughin’ at our society! And we’re all hardworkin’ people and we’re getting’ laughed at for workin’ every day!”[ii]
He goes on to share a bit more of Mamaw’s seemingly contradictory feelings—more like “those hateful Republicans” than the Democrat voter she was:
Hillbilly Elegy
cover image


She’d rant against people we’d see in the grocery store: “I can’t understand why people who’ve worked all their lives scrape by while these deadbeats buy liquor and cell phone coverage with our tax money.”
These were bizarre views for my bleeding-heart grandma. And if she blasted the government for doing too much one day, she’d blast it for doing too little the next….
Mamaw’s sentiments occupied wildly different parts of the political spectrum. Depending on her mood, Mamaw was a radical conservative or a European-style social Democrat…. I began to see the world as Mamaw did. I was scared, confused, angry, and heartbroken. I’d blame large businesses for closing up shop and moving overseas, and then I’d wonder if I might have done the same thing. I’d curse our government for not helping enough, and then I’d wonder if, in its attempts to help, it actually made the problem worse (pp. 223-227).
Even though he wasn’t much of a student in his teen years, he was a curious reader. This section strikes a chord with me:

I consumed books about social policy and the working poor. One book in particular, a study by eminent sociologist William Julius Wilson called The Truly Disadvantaged, struck a nerve. I was sixteen the first time I read it, and though I didn’t fully understand it all, I grasped the core thesis. As millions migrated north to factory jobs, the communities that sprouted up around those factories were vibrant but fragile: When the factories shut their doors, the people left behind were trapped in towns and cities that could no longer support such large populations with high-quality work. Those who could—generally the well educated, wealthy, or well connected—left, leaving behind communities of poor people. These remaining folks were the “truly disadvantaged”—unable to find good jobs on their own and surrounded by communities that offered little in the way of connections or social support.
Wilson’s book spoke to me. I wanted to write him a letter and tell him that he had described my home perfectly. That it resonated so personally is odd, however, because he wasn’t writing about the hillbilly transplants from Appalachia—he was writing about black people in the inner cities. The same was true of Charles Murray’s seminal Losing Ground, another book about black folks that could have been written about hillbillies—which addressed the way our government encouraged social decay through the welfare state (pp. 432-434).
Charles Murray’s book Coming Apart talks about some of the same issues, although more generically about the poor and their behavior that keeps them from social and economic mobility, rather than about blacks in particular. The wealthiest zip codes live a certain way, morally, but they don’t seem to dare share those secrets with the working poor.

Vance continues:

It would be years before I learned that no single book, or expert, or field could fully explain the problems of hillbillies in modern America. Our elegy is a sociological one, yes, but it is also about psychology and community and culture and faith (p. 435).
In Vance’s case, he manages to graduate from high school, spend four years in the Marines, graduate from Ohio State, and then Yale Law School.

It turns out that, for someone of his income level, Yale Law School is not only a better education, but a cheaper option than anything else he might have tried. They have needs-based financial aid available just for such cases. But students like him have no way to know that. As he says, “That first year at Yale taught me most of all that I didn’t know how the world worked” (p. 626).

An earlier example is the picture of him and his grandmother, near the end of his high school years, trying to fill out financial aid forms, being asked about his father’s income. But his legal father had been totally absent from his life for over a decade. Obviously, the form wanted to know what other resources the student had, and clearly his father wasn’t a resource. But, to them, puzzling through something they have no experience with, they’re trying to figure out how to get this unknowable piece of information in order to comply to the powers that be.

This was so familiar to me. Back in junior high (7th-9th grades) I was earning straight As, but at that point in my life, I was completely unaware that there was any possibility I could ever go to college. The message I got was, people like us (i.e., lower-middle-class people like our family) don’t get those kinds of lives.

By 9th grade my friends planted the idea that, of course I could go to college; I just needed to get a scholarship. I thought that meant I had to be the one, smartest, highest GPA student in the high school, and once we combined with another junior high for high school, I didn’t believe that could be possible. (Fortunately, even when I thought that, I didn’t give up. Eventually I got scholarships—after filling out all the forms myself—that covered more than half my tuition, and I graduated, paying my own way through, without debt.)

When I asked about college at home, I was told, “Why would you want to do that? You’re just going to be a housewife.” And, “You’ll have to pay for that yourself, because we’re not paying for it.” Also, I wasn’t allowed to work unless my mother decided to be willing to drive me to and from—walking alone as a girl was not allowed. There was also a slightly more subtle, class-based discouragement: “People that go to college think they’re so smart. They just want to look down on people.”

There’s a lot about my story that is simply about my mother’s psychological issues. But some of the discouragement stems from a lower-middle-class farm and labor environment. I’ve wondered about the Scots-Irish connection, which does appear in that family line. But I think it’s more a matter of living without the understanding of what’s possible.

Vance talks a little bit about solutions—and the difficulty of finding them:

People sometimes ask whether I think there’s anything we can do to “solve” the problems of my community. I know what they’re look for: a magical public policy solution or an innovative government program. But these problems of family, faith, and culture aren’t like a Rubik’s Cube, and I don’t think that solutions (as most understand the term) really exist. A good friend, who worked for a time in the White House and cares deeply about the plight of the working class, once told me, “The best way to look at this might be to recognize that you probably can’t fix these things. They’ll always be around. But maybe you can put your thumb on the scale a little for the people at the margins.”
There were many thumbs put on my scale. When I look back at my life, what jumps out is how many variables had to fall in pace in order to give me a chance (p. 711-712).
In his favor were his grandparents’ constancy. And, among the “revolving door of would-be father figures,” at least his mother never chose abusive men. There was his sister, his aunt and uncle, good teachers, and friends.

Remove any of these people from the equation, and I’m probably screwed. Other people who have overcome the odds cite the same sorts of interventions.
He lists several. Here’s what they had in common:

They had a family member they could count on. And they saw—from a family friend, an uncle, or a work mentor—what was available and what was possible (p. 721).
I’ve often discussed with my husband the people I was surrounded by that made a difference in my life. As I’ve written before, I grew up in Utah, at a time when the community was pretty safe, and families were large and strong. Despite the message I got from home that the happy successful world wasn’t available to someone like me, I had teachers and friends, and mentors from church, who told me otherwise.

I was also blessed that, because we were Mormon, there was no drinking in our house. The most negative person in my life was always sober. And I had examples all around me of people living the lives of civilization to good effect.

While there was a lot of discouragement and uncomfortable angst in my home (and probably less verbal expression of love than J. D. had), I wasn’t in a neighborhood that kept my possibilities limited. Until quite recently, I didn’t recognize how different my growing up experience was from so many friends around me; when you’re a fish swimming in the water, you don’t realize you’re wet. I see now that I was lucky to have gone on to thrive. That thumb was on the scale for me.

As Vance points out about the results of one study, “I wasn’t surprised that Mormon Utah—with its strong church, integrated communities, and intact families—wiped the floor with Rust Belt Ohio” (p. 724).

The problems Vance sees with his community, and maybe other similar poverty pockets, aren’t really about programs. As he says, “the fault lies almost entirely with factors outside the government’s control. It’s what happens at home” (p. 731).

Here’s Vance’s conclusion:

As a cultural emigrant form one group to the other, I am acutely aware of their differences. Sometimes I view members of the elite with an almost primal scorn….But I have to give it to them. Their children are happier and healthier, their divorce rates lower, their church attendance higher, their lives longer” (p. 752).
That’s the message we need to find a way to share with anyone who’s willing to hear it.


[i] I used an e-reader edition, which identified page numbers when I saved my notes. However, the print edition is listed as having 288 pages, so my page numbering seems to relate more to location within the book than to actual pages. It looks like there are around 770 digital pages.
[ii] Rick Perlstein, Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (New York: Scribner, 2008

Thursday, March 30, 2017

Upward Mobility

Here at the Spherical Model, we talk about the interrelationships of the political, economic, and social spheres. Freedom affects prosperity, and both are significantly affected by the civilization level of the people.

I came across a long piece by Megan McCardle for Bloomberg News (I’m estimating 25-30 pages, but online it’s a bit uncertain) about the state of Utah, where I grew up. And the interrelationships are evident.

Let’s start with some descriptions. The story begins with the population: 192,672. That’s the city proper. But that’s not really accurate. That puts it in the range of the Tri-Cities in Washington State (Kennewick, Richland, and Pasco together), which has a small town feel, and not even a 4-year college. The Salt Lake metropolitan area is actually well over a million. And if you extend the area north to Ogden and south to Provo, you’re up to nearly 2.5 million. It’s not as big as, say, Houston, but it’s significant in population size.

Salt Lake City, view from airplane, May 2014


Salt Lake City and surrounding areas have a high percentage of Mormons, since the valley was settled by Mormons after they had been driven from five previous homes by mobs burning and looting their property and killing them. (The Governor of Missouri had signed an extermination order, which made murdering Mormons legal.) So, it’s no wonder they wanted a place of their own, away from threats, where they could settle permanently.

Going back there, when daughter Social Sphere went to college, she commented, “I’ve never seen so many blonds.” I hadn’t noticed it growing up, but she was right. It’s a little startling after Texas. A lot of the Utah population comes from the northeastern US, plus many from England and Scandinavia (my heritage). So blonds are common.

But there are other notable demographics as well. Hispanics are around 22%. Then there are sizable populations of Pacific Islanders, and Asians (Nepal, Myanmar, Sri Lanka), and Bosnians.

There are only about 2.7% blacks. There has never been a migration of blacks to Utah. There has also never been slavery, and blacks (and women) had the vote all along, before statehood in the 1890s (statehood took away the women’s right to vote for a couple of decades). McArdle asserts that institutional racism is the reason blacks stay away—I have to say that’s an incorrect assessment of the people, and of the Mormons. But I’ll save that debate for another day.

Anyway, some of the comparisons between Utah and other places are like apples and oranges just because there isn’t an underlying racism issue. And another overriding question is, can the things that are working be transferred elsewhere, or is it because of the Mormons?

Upward Mobility

Upward mobility—the American Dream—is more likely in Utah than in the rest of the US. The main impetus of the article is to explore why there is this upward mobility gap:

A child born in the bottom quintile of incomes in Charlotte [North Carolina] has only a 4 percent chance of making it into the top quintile. A child in Salt Lake City, on the other hand, has more than a 10.8 percent chance—achingly close to the 11.7 percent found in Denmark and well on the way to the 20 percent chance you would expect in a perfectly just world.
Government Spending

Government spending isn’t the reason. Utah’s government seems to commit very limited funds for both fighting poverty and for education. “Utah is dead last in per-pupil education spending.” It’s not last in educational outcomes, however. For K-12 schools, it ranks 22nd, but in higher education it ranks 2nd. For overall education it ranks 9th.

They have a surprising solution for homelessness that seems to be working, called “Housing First.” It turns out, if you just outright pay for housing for the homeless, before dealing with the cause of that individual’s homelessness, it’s cheaper and more effective than the crisis-led practice of dealing with them once they show up in emergency rooms.

As McArdle summarizes:

That’s the thing about the government here. It is not big, but it’s also not … bad. The state’s compassionate conservatism goes hand-in-hand with an unusually functional bureaucracy.
Volunteer Help

Besides actually cheerful, helpful government workers, the biggest factor seems to be community involvement, with an army of volunteers.

The volunteering starts in the church wards, where bishops keep a close eye on what’s going on in the congregation, and tap members as needed to help each other. If you’re out of work, they may reach out to small business people to find out who’s hiring. If your marriage is in trouble, they’ll find a couple who went through a hard time themselves to offer advice.
Besides the very local, very personal volunteering, there’s also larger, more institutional helping. Welfare Square is visited by governments all over the country and the world, to see how it’s done, and to see what they can replicate. It’s not just a food pantry; it’s a production facility—actually a network of production facilities: bakeries, dairies, canneries, farms, orchards, and more.

Here in Houston we have a peanut butter cannery producing for Church welfare storehouses in Utah and all over. It’s run by volunteer labor. Additionally, the cannery is used by the Houston Food Bank to produce about 400,000 jars a year for local food pantries. The only jars actually sold are to Mormons buying a case or so for their personal family pantries. All the rest is donated to the poor.

LDS Peanut Butter Factory in Houston


Help from the Church is intended to be temporary. And recipients are expected to do volunteer work in exchange for the help, whenever physically possible. Usually help will be to tide a household over for a matter of a few months, all the while helping them find gainful employment, or head toward the training or education they need. There’s no life-long welfare help in the Church.

McArdle contrasts that with government programs:

This combination of financial help and the occasional verbal kick in the pants is something close to what the ideal of government help used to be. Social workers used to make individual judgments about what sort of help their clients needed or deserved. But such judgments always have an inherently subjective and arbitrary quality, which courts began to frown on in the middle of the 20th century, in part because they offered considerable discretion for racial discrimination.
Turning government welfare into an automatic entitlement based on simple rules undoubtedly made it fairer, and kept people from slipping through the cracks. But making it harder to remove benefits from people who stopped trying also made it easier for people to make understandable short-term decisions which turned into long-term dependence, leaving a significant number of people disconnected from work and mired in multi-generational poverty.
One of the factors in upward mobility is what BYU research David Sims calls “middle classness that’s so broad it’s almost infectious.” He means that young people are exposed to social differences beyond how they were raised. Moving up looks possible. And belief leads to efforts to succeed.

Lots of Marriage, Not Much Alcohol

Mormons contribute some additional social benefits. Mormons don’t drink alcohol, so poverty-related outcomes of alcohol addiction are a much smaller problem in Utah.

Also, Mormons are more likely to be married. We’ve talked about the formula for avoiding poverty in America at the Spherical Model from time to time. That comes up again here:

Economists Isabel Sawhill and Ron Haskins famously estimated that we could reduce poverty by 71 percent if the poor did just four things: finished high school, worked full time, got married and had no more than two children — and the number of children was the least important factor in that calculation.
Salt Lake Temple,
photo from the Conference Center
in the rain, January 2012, by Social Sphere
Marriage avoids poverty not only for the couple as individuals, but also for the children in the next generation. Marriage builds social capital. In areas of the US where it looks like upward mobility is racially caused, “once they controlled for the family structure of the community, that effect disappeared. Marriage seems to have more of a correlation with mobility than race does.”
And not just the families of married parents benefit; neighborhoods benefit:

If you live in a neighborhood full of single mothers who had a hard time finishing school, that’s probably the future you’ll expect for yourself and your own kids. If you live in a neighborhood full of thriving two-parent families, that’s probably the future you’ll envision, even if your own father disappeared when you were 2. Marriage matters at the individual level, but it also matters at the community level, because the community can strongly shape individual behavior.
That sounds just like something we’d come up with here at the Spherical Model. Families are the basic unit of civilization. You need a critical mass of families with intact married parents in order to get out of savagery and into civilization.

Results

So, here’s what you need, if you want Utah’s results of exiting poverty. You need married parents raising families with stability and caring. You need a volunteer force to care for the less fortunate. You need people willing to care for one another, rather than leaving that to government. And you need minimal government bureaucracy that, where necessary, is done with care and efficiency.

You might get that where there’s not a handy supply of Mormons. I’m even hopeful that it is possible. That’s what the Spherical Model shows. But if you need social capital to get underway, it sure is handy to start with a Mormon population.