Monday, July 22, 2013

Summer Reading


Summer reading is supposed to be fun and light, to enhance the enjoyment of sun and leisure. On the other hand, what better time to dive into something heavy than when there’s extra reading time? It was summer the year I read Atlas Shrugged (tiny print, 1100 pages). I’ve tackled The Lord of the Rings trilogy in summer (and other times). This summer I just finished a re-read, after several decades, of Adam Bede by George Eliot.
I read it on my Kindle, where it was free, so it didn’t have pagination, but the library lists it as 509 pages. It was first published in England 1859, near the same period as Jane Austen. George Eliot was also a female author, Mary Anne Evans, using a male name in order to be taken seriously (although women were published during that time). Technically she wrote in the Victorian period, while Jane Austen wrote in the Regency period, although Adam Bede takes place during the earlier period. Another difference is that Austen mainly wrote about the noble class. Adam Bede includes some characters from that class, but the main focus is on craftsmen and farmers and common workers. Adam Bede and his brother are journeyman carpenters.
This was a book club choice, which was my reason for picking it up again. I didn’t love it the first time through, although it was memorable. But this time there were things I appreciated more. The main part I remembered, which I found annoyingly unbelievable, was that a young woman, Hetty, who makes butter at her uncle’s dairy farm, gets pregnant and gives birth—and no one knows. The pregnancy follows a brief affair with the local heir to the estate, Arthur. This was taboo on every level, since he could not marry a young woman so far beneath his class. For her own comfort, she then turns to an engagement to Adam Bede, who has loved her all along. But then she discovers the pregnancy. Months go by, and just weeks before the wedding (I’m reckoning at least seven months into the pregnancy, maybe eight), she sets out to find Arthur and ask for help, so that she doesn’t end up a destitute beggar. But his regiment has moved on, and she is out of resources to keep seeking him. She sleeps in haystacks and occasional inns on her way to a young preacher woman, who had been kind to her.
Mistaking a home for an inn, she is allowed by a kind couple to stay, and that night she gives birth. Within a day she has gone back out on the road. She had previously considered killing herself by throwing herself in a pond, but couldn’t do it. Now, with a baby, she considered throwing the baby in the pond, but she can’t do actual killing. She ends up partially burying the baby under some sticks and bark, and half hopes someone will find the baby alive and rescue it. A farmer does find the baby, but it doesn’t survive. Hetty is tracked down and arrested for killing her baby.
None of the family she lived with, nor her fiancĂ©, had any clue that she was pregnant—far enough along that the baby is born alive without help of hospital or special resuscitation. (As far as I can tell, she never feeds it.) I know dresses in that day were high waisted and hid a lot of figure flaws. But I went through multiple pregnancies as a tall person who showed later and less than shorter women (and this woman was described always as small, rounded, and pretty in a kitten-like way), and there was simply no disguising the situation that final trimester. No one noticed anything?
Nevertheless, the way the hypothetical but common situation was handled in this book is an interesting comparison to today.
The young woman and the “gentleman” both knowingly engaged in self-indulgent uncivilized behavior—that they shrank from having anyone learn about. Adam had discovered them kissing, on the day before Arthur was to leave for his regiment, which resulted in a fistfight over honor along with a requirement for Arthur to write to Hetty making it clear to her the relationship could never go further. Adam had no reason to believe the affair had gone further, and didn’t even consider the possibility, because he couldn’t believe evil of the woman he loved. It was inconceivable that two otherwise honorable people could do the heinous act of sex outside of marriage.
So there is tremendous pressure on a young woman who has submitted to passions and finds herself pregnant. She will be rejected by family and polite society. Her baby will also be an outcast. She will be unemployable. It was not unheard of for gentry to have a “natural child” whose care and keeping they paid for, usually anonymously. But clearly the woman who gets pregnant out of wedlock suffers much more than the man involved.
In this story, Arthur does indeed suffer. He finds out about Hetty’s trial just at its end and is unable to help. She is hanged as the law requires. But his shame and guilt are such that he turns over the running of the estate to a trusted friend and leaves for war. He suffers deprivations and illness, forgoes any idea of future love relationships, willingly suffers his self-imposed banishment for many years.
The minds of the characters, even the most flawed ones, are not evil. At worst they are selfish, weak, and overly concerned about opinions of others and personal comfort. That such characters could get into this situation is both unsurprising and pitiable.
One thing the book handled well was the repentance process. There’s a scene where the young woman preacher, Dinah, goes to the prison to be with Hetty. Her loving way of presenting the possibility of repentance and accepting God’s forgiveness is quite beautiful. Loving without condemning is key. And among a mainly civilized people is surprisingly rare. The telling of Adam’s movement from craving vengeance to forgiveness is beautifully and believably done. I’m glad I re-read the book just for that.
Is there a better way to discourage the family-decaying behavior so widely accepted today without the life-condemning consequences of Adam Bede’s world? For the sake of civilization, I hope so.
There’s a hierarchy of outcomes (outlined in more detail at the Spherical Model). Marriage is the first option (and in a civilized world, class level isn’t a preventive to marriage between the two parents). If that is neither possible nor desirable, the best way to provide a two-parent home for the precious child is adoption. And in a civilized society, where families and children are highly valued, families willing to adopt exceed available adoptive children. (That is mostly true today, despite arguments about unwanted children; the ordeal to adopt is a significant sacrifice.) Being raised by the repentant mother, with help from extended family and community (especially church community—not government subsidy) is a third option. It guarantees less for the child, but the mother is likely to be lovingly attached to the child, and, depending on how she lives her life, she may encounter a possible marriage partner who will adopt the child as his own.
Other outcomes tend to be less and less civilized. And the drain on social and economic capital becomes increasingly greater.
What is needed is valuing and strengthening marriage, condemning behaviors that decay the family (sex outside marriage always fits in that category), but not condemning people. Persuade people, with love, toward better behavior—toward love of civilization, toward love of God, who loves them and recommends the path, not to control our lives and prevent enjoyment, but to offer us lives with the greatest abundance of happiness.
How to have an abundance of happiness in our world is a story we need to get better at telling.

Friday, July 19, 2013

SCOTUS 2012-2013 Voting Patterns, Part III


We’ve been looking at the 2012 session of the Supreme Court, which ended June 30, 2013. Part I looked at the full list of cases and how often each justice voted with either a liberal or conservative bloc. Part II looked at just the cases in which there was disagreement, 39 of the total cases, and then measured the percentage of cases in which each justice voted with either bloc.
Today we’ll look at how many were close decisions, and how many had greater agreement.
There were 22 close decisions, decided by a single vote. A 4-5 vote means 4 conservative dissenting votes (which may or may not all have come from the usual conservative bloc), and 5 majority votes going with the liberal bloc. A 5-4 vote means 5 conservative majority votes and 4 liberal dissenting votes. Some of the cases note an abstention. Note that this relates to the dispersion of the justices’ votes, not necessarily the ideology of the decision. Also note that this data does not include the 35 cases with complete agreement. One thing I noticed was that the easy decisions tended to come early in the session, with the more divided cases being pushed to the end. The most controversial decisions show up in June, and likely late June.

Close Decisions
Vote Dispersion
Number of Such Cases
Percentage
4-5
8
40.9% favor L
3-5-1
1
5-4
12
59.1% favor C
5-3-1
1
Total
22
56.4% are close decisions

 
Moderately Close Decisions
Vote Dispersion
Number of Such Cases
Percentage
3-6
6
100% favor L
2-6-1
1
6-3
0
0% favor C
5-2-1
0
Total
7
17.9% are moderately close decisions

 
High Agreement Decisions
Vote Dispersion
Number of Such Cases
Percentage
2-7
3
40.0% favor L
1-8
1
7-2
3
60.0% favor C
8-1
2
7-1-1
1
Total
10
25.6% are high agreement decisions

The very mixed case of Missouri v. McNeely is considered a 1-8 decision, because there were 8 majority or concurring opinions in all or part, and only 1 dissent without partial agreement. The dispersion, however, doesn’t well identify the differences of opinion on that particular case. Some of the closer cases are also more mixed than this broad look shows.
If you look at all 39 decisions, 20 leaned toward the liberal bloc, and 19 leaned toward the conservative bloc. That’s 51.3% L and 48.7% C. So there’s a slight lean toward L overall. However, on the close cases, the lean is toward C. The majority of cases (without total agreement) are close cases. That means that for the time being there is a slight advantage toward C.
Five years into this administration, so far there has been no change to the conservative bloc on the court. Two liberal justices were replaced, with Justices Kagan and Sotomayor. If either Ginsburg or Breyer were to step down, the replacement is certain to be at least as liberal as the current justices. This is somewhat likely: Justice Ginsburg is 80 and has served since 1993. Justice Breyer, who has served since 1994, is a relatively young 75 (next month), so I expect he will stay.
If any of the other five steps down, even Kennedy, the weight toward the already solid L bloc shifts so dramatically that taking any controversial decision to the Supreme Court would be assumed to go toward the liberal direction. How likely is a change to these five? Here’s the age and length of service data.

Justice
Age
Year Appointed
Length of Service
Thomas
65
1991
22 years
Scalia
77
1986
27 years
Alito
63
2006
7 years
Roberts
58
2005
8 years
Kennedy
77
1988
25 years

(Happy Birthday to Justice Kennedy next week.) The conservative bloc is relatively young. Barring sudden health problems, it is quite likely the four conservatives will stay throughout this presidential term. I think they know how crucial their point of view is to the court. I believe it is also relatively likely Kennedy will stay; I think he knows he is a swing vote, and his leaving would cause some upheaval to the country that he could avoid simply by waiting until someone else makes a change first. He can’t do that indefinitely, but he can probably do it until after another presidential election.
Observations
It would take a deeper look at the Court to reveal all that this session can tell us. But I will make just a couple of observations based on specific cases. (I wrote more here, "On the Court," and here, "Marriage Rulings.")
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin concerned using race in acceptance policies. In the specific case, a young white woman, who was just under the automatic admittance level, was refused admittance when a black woman with lower qualifications was admitted. The young woman was discriminated against because of her race. In recent past cases, race has been allowed in admittance as one of many factors a university could use. While that policy isn’t completely wiped out, this case makes it clear that using race will cause discrimination against someone, and the trend is toward avoiding race in selection criteria for that reason. This has been a conservative argument for a long time, so it is surprising that the liberal bloc also agreed. Justice Sotomayor abstained, but only Justice Ginsburg dissented.
The other case that reflects the trend of social belief is the US v Windsor case, concerning the federal Defense of Marriage Act. The case itself concerned inheritance law for two women "married" in Ontario, Canada. Their "marriage" contract was recognized by the state of New York, but when one of the parties died and left her estate to her partner, Windsor, the federal government refused Windsor the federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses.
I have some sympathy for the parties involved; a person ought to be able to say how their estate should be dispersed without the federal government coming in and glomming on to major portions of it. But the difficulty is in using the case to redefine “spouse” and “marriage.” It is likely the problem could have been avoided if the parties recognized that their contract was not recognized in the country they immigrated to; they could therefore have drawn up trusts and other contracts to accomplish the inheritance with as little tax damage as possible. Instead they use the case to force policy on the entirety of their new country. On purpose?
Such a case was bound to appear eventually. But the majority ruling, with Kennedy sneering at the vast majority of all the people in the history of the world who see a value in what has always been marriage, was beyond the pale. Scalia’s dissent was equally cutting in return, pointing out how un-Court-like it was for such personal social ideas to be put forward as Court ruling void of connection to the actual written law.
I don’t know what the eventual fallout will be, but it is clear that controversial decisions can be decided either based on the law or based on social opinion trends, which have been manipulated by media in opposition to mounting social data.
The Supreme Court was never intended to have such power over the people. It is meant merely to keep the legislative and executive branches in check, so we are not deprived of our Constitutionally protected rights. I pray that these nine people will agree more—by reading and understanding the Constitution, as their oath requires them to do.

Wednesday, July 17, 2013

SCOTUS Voting Patterns 2012-2013, Part II

In our last post, there was only room to deal with the overall mass of data. Today we’ll pare it down a bit, to see if that leads to any further insights. Data comes from the Supreme Court website, slip opinions.

I decided to make an assumption, that when the court is in agreement (unanimous, or all majority and concurring), those cases deal with technicalities of the law, rather than political ideology. I don’t know if that is true, but I thought it would be worth looking at only the cases in which there is disagreement. Of the 74 cases, 35 cases were full agreement cases. That left 39 cases to look at for patterns of disagreement.
In this chart, dissent (minority opinion) is in green; majority and concurring opinions are in red. The light blue shows individual abstentions. There’s still a pretty good sea of agreement, but it’s much more balanced between agreement and dissent than when the unanimous cases are included.
 
This is admittedly a broad brush. Concurring opinions may mean there’s agreement with the direction of the judgment, but for different reasoning. Sometimes there is agreement with exceptions, or agreement only on specific points. The Missouri v. McNeely case was particularly mixed, with various combinations of agreement and dissent on various points. Here’s how the decision is summarized:
SOTOMAYOR, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, II-B, and IV, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, GINSBURG, and KAGAN, J.J., joined, and opinion with respect to Parts II-C and III, in which SCALIA, GINSBURG, and KAGAN, J.J., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in part. ROBERTS, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BREYER and ALITO, J.J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
I took this oddity into consideration when counting dissent and majority opinions, with several of the justices getting half a count each way on this particular case. The chart below, similar to the one in Monday's post, deals with just the 39 cases in which there was disagreement. Majority and concurring opinions are combined, in yellow; dissents are in green, abstentions are light blue. Then I look at the ratios in which each justice joins with the conservative bloc and the liberal bloc.
To review, a bloc requires at least three of the like-minded justices voting together; when either side was two/two on a case, Kennedy would determine whether there was a bloc vote. I show both the ratio (number of times voting with the bloc over the total number of cases) and the percentage of voting with the bloc.
 
From this we can look at who most frequently agrees and disagrees. I thought it might help to rate them by percentage. 

Justice
%w/C bloc
C Rating
 
Justice
% w/L bloc
L Rating
Roberts
92.3%
1
 
Kagan
97.4%
1
Alito
81.6%
2
 
Ginsburg
92.3%
2
Thomas
76.9%
3
 
Breyer
89.7%
3
Scalia
76.9%
3
 
Sotomayor
89.2%
4
Kennedy
74.9%
5
 
Kennedy
48.7%
5
Breyer
41.0%
6
 
Roberts
41.0%
6
Kagan
28.9%
7
 
Scalia
41.0%
6
Sotomayor
27.0%
8
 
Alito
26.3%
8
Ginsburg
25.6%
9
 
Thomas
25.6%
9

Kennedy, as you’d expect, is rated in the middle with both blocs. It does appear that the liberal bloc is more solid: all four vote with the bloc better than 89% of the time. Only Roberts is that connected to the conservative bloc. But Roberts isn’t as disconnected from the liberal bloc as the liberals are from the conservatives. Breyer is equally connected to the opposite bloc as Roberts is. But Kagan, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg are connected to the conservative bloc well under 30% of the time. Only Thomas and Alito are that disconnected from the liberal bloc, but they are also much less connected to their own bloc. In other words, Thomas especially, and also to some extent Alito, vote the way they think regardless of the opinions of colleagues.
We haven’t yet looked at how many of the 39 cases are close decisions, and how many were less narrow rulings. Nor have we looked at individual differences on some specific cases. So there's enough for next time, in Part III.