I’ve finally gathered enough data to take an overall look at
this past Supreme Court session. The question I’m looking at concerns
cohesiveness vs. division on the court. How much agreement overall, and how
much ideological division? The data may not answer the specific questions we
have about ideology, but it’s an interesting piece of data.
There were 79 cases in the session; five were per curiam, so in the overall count I
have eliminated those and dealt with the remaining 74 cases. Of those, 35 are
essentially unanimous (some are listed as unanimous; some are unanimous with
concurring opinions; some are listed as majority with concurring, but no
dissents.) The probability is that those cases are mainly non-political, and
just technical issues of law. I may take another look at the data later,
removing the unanimous cases. But with those included, there is quite a lot of
agreement on the court.
The photo is the draft I printed out after organizing the
actual votes. Blue means majority, concurring, and unanimous opinions. Yellow
is dissent. Orange is abstaining (recusal of a justice on a particular case). You
can see there is a sea of blue.
Last time I did a piece like this (April 2012), it was
relatively early in the session, to see if there was possibly any predictive
information prior to the Obamacare ruling. The data was small enough not to be
unwieldy. While I have the database of all the votes for this year’s session, I
haven’t got a way to condense it to be looked at in this blog. So I’m only
presenting the sub-database concerning how often each voted with the majority
(including concurring opinions, which means agreement with the ruling but for
different reasoning), how many dissents. And from that we can also see
connection to voting blocks.
The conservative voting bloc is Thomas, Scalia, Alito and
Roberts, with sometimes Kennedy. The liberal voting bloc is Kagan, Sotomayor,
Breyer, Ginsburg, and sometimes Kennedy. If there was a bloc on a case, that
meant there were at least three of the bloc voting together (either with the
majority or the dissent). When a bloc was two-two, Kennedy determined whether
to consider whether a bloc existed. Note that it is possible on a case for a
justice to be either with both blocs or against both blocs.
I don’t know whether we can say what this all means. But
there are probably a few observations we can make from this data, so we’ll that
in the next post.
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