We’ve been looking at the 2012 session of the Supreme Court,
which ended June 30, 2013. Part I looked at the full list of cases and how
often each justice voted with either a liberal or conservative bloc. Part II
looked at just the cases in which there was disagreement, 39 of the total
cases, and then measured the percentage of cases in which each justice voted
with either bloc.
Today we’ll look at how many were close decisions, and how
many had greater agreement.
There were 22 close decisions, decided by a single vote. A
4-5 vote means 4 conservative dissenting votes (which may or may not all have
come from the usual conservative bloc), and 5 majority votes going with the
liberal bloc. A 5-4 vote means 5 conservative majority votes and 4 liberal
dissenting votes. Some of the cases note an abstention. Note that this relates
to the dispersion of the justices’ votes, not necessarily the ideology of the
decision. Also note that this data does not include the 35 cases with complete
agreement. One thing I noticed was that the easy decisions tended to come early
in the session, with the more divided cases being pushed to the end. The most
controversial decisions show up in June, and likely late June.
Close Decisions
|
||
Vote
Dispersion
|
Number
of Such Cases
|
Percentage
|
4-5
|
8
|
40.9%
favor L
|
3-5-1
|
1
|
|
5-4
|
12
|
59.1% favor C
|
5-3-1
|
1
|
|
Total
|
22
|
56.4% are close decisions
|
Moderately Close Decisions
|
||
Vote
Dispersion
|
Number
of Such Cases
|
Percentage
|
3-6
|
6
|
100%
favor L
|
2-6-1
|
1
|
|
6-3
|
0
|
0% favor C
|
5-2-1
|
0
|
|
Total
|
7
|
17.9% are moderately close decisions
|
High Agreement Decisions
|
||
Vote
Dispersion
|
Number
of Such Cases
|
Percentage
|
2-7
|
3
|
40.0% favor L
|
1-8
|
1
|
|
7-2
|
3
|
60.0% favor C
|
8-1
|
2
|
|
7-1-1
|
1
|
|
Total
|
|
25.6% are high agreement decisions
|
The very mixed case of Missouri v. McNeely is considered a
1-8 decision, because there were 8 majority or concurring opinions in all or
part, and only 1 dissent without partial agreement. The dispersion, however,
doesn’t well identify the differences of opinion on that particular case. Some
of the closer cases are also more mixed than this broad look shows.
If you look at all 39 decisions, 20 leaned toward the
liberal bloc, and 19 leaned toward the conservative bloc. That’s 51.3% L and
48.7% C. So there’s a slight lean toward L overall. However, on the close
cases, the lean is toward C. The majority of cases (without total agreement) are
close cases. That means that for the time being there is a slight advantage
toward C.
Five years into this administration, so far there has been
no change to the conservative bloc on the court. Two liberal justices were
replaced, with Justices Kagan and Sotomayor. If either Ginsburg or Breyer were
to step down, the replacement is certain to be at least as liberal as the
current justices. This is somewhat likely: Justice Ginsburg is 80 and has
served since 1993. Justice Breyer, who has served since 1994, is a relatively
young 75 (next month), so I expect he will stay.
If any of the other five steps down, even Kennedy, the weight
toward the already solid L bloc shifts so dramatically that taking any
controversial decision to the Supreme Court would be assumed to go toward the
liberal direction. How likely is a change to these five? Here’s the age and
length of service data.
Justice
|
Age
|
Year
Appointed
|
Length
of Service
|
Thomas
|
65
|
1991
|
22 years
|
Scalia
|
77
|
1986
|
27 years
|
Alito
|
63
|
2006
|
7 years
|
Roberts
|
58
|
2005
|
8 years
|
Kennedy
|
77
|
1988
|
25 years
|
(Happy Birthday to Justice Kennedy next week.) The
conservative bloc is relatively young. Barring sudden health problems, it is
quite likely the four conservatives will stay throughout this presidential term.
I think they know how crucial their point of view is to the court. I believe it
is also relatively likely Kennedy will stay; I think he knows he is a swing
vote, and his leaving would cause some upheaval to the country that he could
avoid simply by waiting until someone else makes a change first. He can’t do
that indefinitely, but he can probably do it until after another presidential
election.
Observations
It would take a deeper look at the Court to reveal all that
this session can tell us. But I will make just a couple of observations based
on specific cases. (I wrote more here, "On the Court," and here, "Marriage Rulings.")
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin concerned using race
in acceptance policies. In the specific case, a young white woman, who was just
under the automatic admittance level, was refused admittance when a black woman
with lower qualifications was admitted. The young woman was discriminated
against because of her race. In recent past cases, race has been allowed in
admittance as one of many factors a university could use. While that policy isn’t
completely wiped out, this case makes it clear that using race will cause
discrimination against someone, and the trend is toward avoiding race in
selection criteria for that reason. This has been a conservative argument for a
long time, so it is surprising that the liberal bloc also agreed. Justice
Sotomayor abstained, but only Justice Ginsburg dissented.
The other case that reflects the trend of social belief is
the US v Windsor case, concerning the federal Defense of Marriage Act. The case
itself concerned inheritance law for two women "married" in Ontario, Canada.
Their "marriage" contract was recognized by the state of New York, but when one
of the parties died and left her estate to her partner, Windsor, the federal
government refused Windsor the federal estate tax exemption for surviving
spouses.
I have some sympathy for the parties involved; a person
ought to be able to say how their estate should be dispersed without the
federal government coming in and glomming on to major portions of it. But the
difficulty is in using the case to redefine “spouse” and “marriage.” It is
likely the problem could have been avoided if the parties recognized that their
contract was not recognized in the country they immigrated to; they could
therefore have drawn up trusts and other contracts to accomplish the
inheritance with as little tax damage as possible. Instead they use the case to
force policy on the entirety of their new country. On purpose?
Such a case was bound to appear eventually. But the majority
ruling, with Kennedy sneering at the vast majority of all the people in the
history of the world who see a value in what has always been marriage, was
beyond the pale. Scalia’s dissent was equally cutting in return, pointing out
how un-Court-like it was for such personal social ideas to be put forward as
Court ruling void of connection to the actual written law.
I don’t know what the eventual fallout will be, but it is
clear that controversial decisions can be decided either based on the law or based
on social opinion trends, which have been manipulated by media in opposition to
mounting social data.
The Supreme Court was never intended to have such power over
the people. It is meant merely to keep the legislative and executive branches
in check, so we are not deprived of our Constitutionally protected rights. I
pray that these nine people will agree more—by reading and understanding the
Constitution, as their oath requires them to do.
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